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        <title>Aviacionline - United States</title>
        <link>https://www.aviacionline.com</link>
        <description>Aviacionline es el sitio de aviación en español más leído del mundo. Presenta noticias de aerolíneas, aviones, aeropuertos, y demás.</description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Not even at Christmas is the F-35 program spared from the Pentagon's damning reports]]></title>
            <link>https://www.aviacionline.com/english/defence/united-states/not-even-at-christmas-is-the-f-35-program-spared-from-the-pentagon-s-damning-reports_a694d6e9a7a89b44e00832556</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Dec 2025 17:01:16 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The F-35 program closes 2025 under the shadow of a new report from the Pentagon‘s Inspector General: millions in payments without results and a ‘ghost fleet’ without mission capability.]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program closes out 2025 not with solutions, but with the official certification of a management crisis that has long moved beyond technical issues and has now become a systemic risk. The latest report by the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG-2026-039), published on December 19, serves as the “forensic evidence” of the warnings we raised last September regarding the program’s lack of predictability and chronic cost overruns.

While the GAO report released in September focused on production bottlenecks and the troubled development of TR-3, this new OIG audit dissects sustainment and exposes an alarming disconnect between public spending and actual operational capability.




WAIVING REQUIREMENTS AS STANDARD PRACTICE

One of the most critical points highlighted in our September analysis was the emergence of a “ghost fleet”: airframes delivered but not combat-capable. The December 19 report elevates this concern to the contractual level.

The Inspector General (DoD OIG) reveals that the Joint Program Office (JPO) deliberately omitted Full Mission Capability (FMC) and Aircraft Availability (AVA) metrics from the June 2024 sustainment contracts. Instead of penalizing Lockheed Martin for poor operational performance, the JPO chose to dilute contractual requirements. This is not merely an administrative failure; it is a technical capitulation. While the GAO criticized distorted incentives, the OIG confirms that the Department of Defense (now effectively functioning as a Department of War) has disbursed USD 1.7 billion for a service that fails to meet the minimum availability standards required by the Armed Forces.


OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES UNDER STRAIN

From an operational capability standpoint, the gap between the F-35 and the fourth-generation systems it is meant to replace (F-16, F/A-18, AV-8) is becoming increasingly paradoxical:

 * Information dominance vs. physical availability: The F-35 delivers situational awareness unmatched by any previous platform thanks to data fusion. Yet the December report confirms that this complexity is also its Achilles’ heel. Availability rates are so erratic that technological superiority is effectively neutralized by logistical uncertainty.
 * Mortgaged life cycle: The USD 38 billion increase in life-cycle costs driven by premature wear of the F135 engine is not a theoretical projection but an operational reality. The OIG directly links this increase to the inability to manage spare parts and inventory data.


THE “BLACKOUT” OF TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL DATA

Senior military leadership understands that a weapons system is only as effective as its supply chain. This is where the most profound difference emerges between the September analysis and the new report:

 * In September, the focus was on 4,000 missing parts at the final assembly stage.
 * In December, the OIG reveals that the government lacks visibility over inventory it has already paid for. Lockheed Martin has failed to integrate these data into the Government-Furnished Property Module.

This opacity creates a critical operational unknown: the Pentagon cannot independently verify which spare parts it owns or where they are located. This places the planned transfer of sustainment responsibilities to the Air Force and Navy in 2027 under an extreme risk of logistical paralysis.




LIMITATIONS, RISKS, AND UNKNOWNS

The OIG report makes clear that the use of Undefinitized Contract Actions (UCAs)—contracts in which price and terms are agreed months after work has already begun—has become the operational norm. This generates systemic risks across several dimensions:

 * Flight safety: insufficient oversight by Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs) at operational bases increases the likelihood that critical quality deficiencies will go undetected.
 * Block 4 degradation: delays to TR-3, combined with a lack of maintenance incentives, suggest that the current fleet could remain stuck in a degraded “interim” configuration for much of this decade.
 * Contractor dependency: without access to technical and inventory data, U.S. Armed Forces lose logistical sovereignty, becoming effectively captive to the original contractor (Lockheed Martin) for any sustained deployment.




CAN AIR SUPERIORITY EXIST UNDER LOGISTICAL SERVITUDE?

The GAO’s September warning about a collapse in predictability may have arrived too late. The December report confirms that the collapse has already occurred and that the Department of Defense is now operating under a state of contractual exception. This maneuver appears designed to mask strategic weakness while maintaining—at any cost—the pace of replacing fourth-generation platforms. It amounts to doubling down: accepting as many incomplete airframes as possible in the hope that structural failures will be resolved later.

Under these conditions, the question is no longer when the F-35 program will stabilize. The real uncertainty is when customers—particularly European partners—will receive airframes meeting the definitive Block 4 standard, and whether they will ever gain genuine logistical control over the system. Without a deep reform that restores accountability, recovers inventory visibility, and reasserts government authority over contracts, the F-35 risks becoming a monument to inefficiency.

The outcome would be as paradoxical as it is dangerous: NATO’s most advanced fighter, designed to dominate 21st-century airspace, could find itself unable to translate technological weight into combat power—its airframes left idle, gathering dust at rear bases.]]></content:encoded>
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            <title><![CDATA[USS Gerald R. Ford deployment and Dominican basing moves point to an imminent U.S. military operation against Venezuela]]></title>
            <link>https://www.aviacionline.com/english/defence/uss-gerald-r--ford-deployment-and-dominican-basing-moves-point-to-an-imminent-u-s--military-operation-against-venezuela_a6927beb343d3900708afac41</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 27 Nov 2025 01:31:17 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The convergence of a carrier strike group near Puerto Rico, strategic bombers, and newly enabled logistics in San Isidro forms the clearest pre-war posture seen in the region in decades.]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The sequence of military, diplomatic, and operational movements recorded across the Caribbean in recent weeks points to a clear pattern: Washington is building a military encirclement far beyond the logic of a limited operation against criminal networks—an operation already heavily questioned internally due to its legality. The presence of the USS Gerald R. Ford, the deployment of strategic bombers, the positioning of special operations forces in Puerto Rico, and new logistical agreements with the Dominican Republic form a force package whose scale and synchronization evoke the early stages of a major military campaign.

Meanwhile, U.S. and European aviation authorities have issued severe warnings to commercial air traffic about the risk of “military activity” in the airspace surrounding Venezuela—an alert that typically precedes scenarios involving air combat.


A NUCLEAR GIANT OPERATING 50 KM FROM PUERTO RICO

The centerpiece of the deployment is the Carrier Strike Group 12, led by the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78). SAR imagery from November 26 placed it roughly 50 km south of Ponce. While radar resolution prevents full confirmation, the location matches the traffic pattern reported since its entry into U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility in October.



Its combat air wing—featuring fifth-generation F-35C fighters and EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft—is critical for dismantling Venezuela’s dense integrated air defense network (IADS), which includes Russian-made S-300VM, Pantsir-S1 and Buk-M2E systems, among others.




SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN ACTIVE PREPARATION IN PUERTO RICO

In parallel, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) conducted military parachute training at Camp Santiago, Puerto Rico, as part of a high-tempo SOCOM rotation under SOUTHCOM. In crisis scenarios, these units act as the tip of the spear for special reconnaissance, seizure of strategic objectives, and securing critical infrastructure.



The geographical setting is not incidental: the presence of a Maritime Special Purpose Force indicates preparation for tactical incursions into hostile territory.


STRATEGIC BOMBERS MAKING THEIR PRESENCE FELT

On November 24, the USAF deployed B-52H bombers in a Bomber Attack Demo over the Caribbean under Operation Southern Spear. These flights were complemented by B-1B Lancers: on October 27, two of them flew just a few dozen miles off Venezuela’s coast, only 33 km from Margarita Island.



These are not aircraft used for counter-narcotics interdiction. They are platforms for launching stand-off cruise missiles—such as JASSM—designed to strike command-and-control centers without entering enemy air defense range.


DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: THE LOGISTICS HUB OF THE OFFENSIVE

Following a lightning visit by U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth to the National Palace in Santo Domingo, the government of President Luis Abinader authorized the “temporary” use of San Isidro Air Base and Las Américas International Airport for U.S. military aircraft.



Although the v and “Operation Southern Spear,” the assets deployed tell another story:

 * KC-135 Stratotankers: Tankers are critical. They allow U.S. fighters to operate from Florida or from the carrier itself and remain over Venezuelan airspace for hours, extending combat radius and loiter time.
 * C-130 Hercules: Used for rapid logistics and aeromedical evacuation (MEDEVAC), a capacity required when casualties are anticipated.

Hegseth was blunt in describing the DR as the “principal ally in the region,” a statement that provides political cover for the operation in the eyes of the international community.




CLOSED SKIES: PRELUDE TO A WARTIME SCENARIO

Perhaps the most ominous indicator that conflict is imminent comes from civil aviation authorities. Both the FAA (NOTAM A0012/25) and Spanish authorities (following EASA directives) issued red alerts for the Maiquetía Flight Information Region (FIR).

The FAA now requires operators to notify flights 72 hours in advance and explicitly warns of the risk of “military activity” and anti-aircraft systems at all altitudes. Spain, for its part, has extended its recommendation not to fly to Venezuela until December 1. In aviation language, this is equivalent to clearing the battlespace to avoid accidental civilian shootdowns—similar to past incidents in Ukraine or Iran.




"EASY WAY OR HARD WAY"

The political component completes the picture. Trump’s latest statements add a decisive layer: he said he is willing to talk with Maduro “if it saves lives,” but followed with his usual warning that “if we have to do it the hard way, that’s fine too.”



This mix of openness and threat keeps the full spectrum of options available and gives him room to escalate or de-escalate as needed. At the same time, the ambiguity can act as a mechanism to restrain a preventive reaction from Caracas while Washington aligns every piece of the military device before moving, if it chooses, from pressure to action.

The buildup of forces —CVN-78, B-52s, KC-135s in the Dominican Republic, a MEU in Puerto Rico— far exceeds the requirements of any counter-narcotics operation. The United States has positioned everything necessary for a suppression-of-air-defenses campaign and decapitation strikes against the regime. The question in defense circles is no longer if there will be an intervention, but when the order will be given to cross the red line.]]></content:encoded>
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